How we cite our quotes: Citations follow this format: (Canto.Line). We used Allen Mandelbaum's translation.
Quote #1
[Piccarda]: "Brother, the power of love appeases our
will so – we only long for what we have;
we do not thirst for greater blessedness.
Should we desire a higher sphere than ours,
then our desires would be discordant with
the will of Him who has assigned us here,
but you'll see no such discord in these spheres;
to live in love is – here – necessity,
if you think on love's nature carefully.
The essence of this blessed life consists
in keeping to the boundaries of God's will,
through which our wills become one single will;
so that, as we are ranged from step to step
throughout this kingdom, all this kingdom wills
that which will please the King whose will is rule." (Par. III, 70-84)
All of Piccarda's talk about love is really a discussion about free will. The souls in the heaven of the moon, do not "desire a sphere higher than ours / [because] then our desires would be discordant with / the will of Him." This really means that the blessed souls have aligned their free wills to God's will. This becomes clear later when she talks about "keeping to the boundaries of God's will / through which our wills become one single will." Because God wills what is just, when the blessed align their wills to His, they have no need for "thirst[ing] for greater blessedness" because they have gotten exactly what they want and deserve.
Quote #2
[Beatrice]: "That which Timaeus said in reasoning
of souls does not describe what you have seen,
since it would seem that as he speaks he thinks.
He says the soul returns to that same star
from which – so he believes – it had been taken
when nature sent that soul as form to body;
but his opinion is, perhaps, to be
taken in other guise than his words speak,
intending something not to be derided.
If to these spheres he wanted to attribute
honor and blame for what they influence,
perhaps his arrow reaches something true. (Par. IV, 49-60)
One of Dante's doubts, spurred by seeing inconstant souls on the moon, is that if souls originate from these stars, live according to their faults, and return to them at death, the stars basically ordain human life and threaten the concept of free will. This theory had been published before by Timaeus, a Greek philosopher. Here, Beatrice dismisses Dante's fear, implying that the stars do not predestine human life, but only influence it. In light of what we know so far, though, these stars have a somewhat unwelcome influence over human lives.
Quote #3
[Beatrice]: "If violence means that the one who suffers
has not abetted force in any way,
then there is no excuse these souls can claim:
for will, if it resists, is never spent,
but acts as nature acts when fire ascends,
though force – a thousand times – tries to compel.
So that, when will has yielded much or little,
it has abetted force – as these souls did:
they could have fled back to their holy shelter.
Had their will been as whole as that which held
Lawrence fast to the grate and that which made
of Mucius one who judged his own hand, then
once freed, they would have willed to find the faith
from which they had dragged; but it is all
too seldom that a will is so intact." (Par. IV, 73-87)
Here we learn that some forms of free will are better or more "intact" than others. Those with perfect free will learn to stand up for what is right. Beatrice cites St. Lawrence, an early proponent of Christianity in the days of old pagan Rome, who is said to have willingly "held…fast to the grate" when he was grilled alive by Emperor Valerian for his beliefs. Mucius, who tried to assassinate Porsena for besieging Rome and was punished by being burnt alive, willingly thrust his hand into the fire while unwaveringly telling Porsena that he would eventually be killed by Romans. These two figures are exemplars of perfectly intact free will.
Quote #4
[Beatrice to Dante]: "At that point – I would have you see – the force
to which one yielded mingles with one's will;
and no excuse can pardon their joint act.
Absolute will does not concur in the wrong;
but the contingent will, through fear that its resistance might bring greater harm, consents." (Par. IV, 106-111)
Free will seems related to love. If we recall Purgatorio canto XVII, natural love always holds God as the object of love, while "mental love" can choose to love the wrong object in the wrong proportion. Here, "absolute will does not concur in the wrong"; it always stands up for right while the lesser "contingent will, through fear that its / resistance might bring greater harm, consents [to wrong]."
Quote #5
[Beatrice]: "The greatest gift the magnanimity
of God, as He created, gave, the gift
most suited to His goodness, gift that He
most prizes, was the freedom of the will;
those beings that have intellect – all these
and none but these – received and do receive
this gift: thus you may draw, as consequence,
the high worth of a vow, when what is pledged
with your consent encounters God's consent;
for when a pact is drawn between a man
and God, then through free will, a man gives up
what I have called his treasure, his free will." (Par. V, 19-30)
In explaining how vows work, Beatrice reminds Dante that only God's infinite goodness gave man the gift of free will. Like life itself, free will is a gift from God which man has a responsibility to honor and use virtuously. Thus, when someone makes a vow, he knowingly renounces the free will God has given him and puts himself solely at the mercy of God's will.
Quote #6
[Dante to Charles Martel]: "…so may you clear the doubt
that rose in me when you – before – described
how from a gentle seed, hash fruit derives."…
[Martel]: "The Good that moves and makes content the realm
through which you now ascend, makes providence
act as a force in these great heavens' bodies;
and in the Mind that, in itself, is perfect,
not only are the natures of His creatures
but their well-being, too, provided for;
and thus, whatever this bow shoots must fall
according to a providential end,
just like a shaft directed to its target.
Where this not so, the heavens you traverse
would bring about effects in such a way
that they would not be things of art but shards." (Par. VIII, 91-108)
Here, Charles Martel explains how seeming aberrations from Fate – such as sons who are morally unlike their fathers – are indeed part of God's plan. Such seeming errors on God's part are explained and justified through providence. So what may initially seem evil, like a bad prince whose father was a good king, ultimately works toward mankind's well being.
Quote #7
[Cacciaguida]: …"Contingency,
while not extending past the book in which
your world of matter has been writ, is yet
in the Eternal Vision all depicted
(but this does not imply necessity,
just as a ship that sails downstream is not
determined by the eye that watches it)." (Par. XVII, 36-42)
Contingency, or "the events of the material world" (as defined by Mandelbaum), basically solves the problem between God's omniscience (his "Eternal Vision") and man's free will. Just because God knows everything that will happen does not mean that he causes things to happen. Instead, events are contingent (or dependent) upon one another, meaning that man still has the free will to choose how he will act.
Quote #8
[Cacciaguida on Dante's destiny]: "You shall leave everything you love most dearly:
this is the arrow that the bow of exile
shoots first. You are to know the bitter taste
of others' bread, how salt it is, and know
how hard a path it is for one who goes
descending and ascending others' stairs.
And what will be most hard for you to bear
will be the scheming, senseless company
that is to share your fall into this valley;
against you they will be insane, completely
ungrateful and profane; and yet, soon after,
not you but they will have their brows bloodred.
Of their insensate acts, the proof will be
in the effects; and thus, your honor will
be best kept if your party is your self." (Par. XVII, 55-69)
Cacciaguida tells Dante of his own fate. However, according to the theory of contingency, Dante – armed with this foreknowledge – has the free will to do everything in his power to prevent his exile.
Quote #9
[Cacciaguida]: "Son, these are glosses of what you had heard;
these are the snares that hide beneath brief years.
Yet I'd not have you envying your neighbors;
your life will long outlast the punishment
that is to fall upon their treacheries." (Par. XVII, 95-99)
In a more optimistic view of fate, Cacciaguida assures Dante that he will be saved; this is how his "life will long outlast" those of his treacherous "neighbors." One might read this as a warning to Dante not to use his free will in any ill-becoming way that would threaten his foretold salvation.
Quote #10
[The Eagle]: "When these souls left their bodies, they were not
Gentiles – as you believe – but Christians, one
with firm faith in the Feet that suffered, one
in Feet that were to suffer. One, from Hell,
where there is no returning to right will,
returned to his own bones, as the reward
bestowed upon a living hope, the hope
that gave force to the prayers offered God
to resurrect him and convert his will.
Returning briefly to the flesh, that soul
in glory – he of whom I speak – believed
in Him whose power could help him and, believing,
was kindled to such a fire of true love
that, when he died a second death, he was
worthy to join in this festivity.
The other, through the grace that surges from
a well so deep that no created one
has ever thrust his eye to its first source,
below set all his love on righteousness,
so that, through grace on grace, God granted him
the sight of our redemption in the future;
thus he, believing that, no longer suffered
the stench of paganism and rebuked
those who persisted in that perverse way…
How distant, o predestination, is
your root from those whose vision does not see
the Primal Cause in Its entirety!" (Par. XX, 103-132)
Here, the Eagle shows Dante just how ignorant mankind is of God's predestination. Dante is surprised at seeing two notoriously pagan figures, the emperor Trajan and Ripheus of Troy, among the blessed souls in the heaven of Jupiter. The Eagle explains their salvation. They both reached heaven because God had ordained they would. Trajan, who died after the Crucifixion, was given the singular glory of returning from Hell to his body to die again absolved of his sins. The Trojan Ripheus, who died before the coming of Christ, lived so virtuously and that God allowed him a vision of the future—Ripheus promptly converted and was saved. Notice the emphasis on sight. In his second life, Trajan "believed in Him," a form of true sight," and Ripheus "thrust his eye to its first source" or saw God clearly. These purified visions saved them. The Eagle then laments that Dante's "vision does not see / the Primal Cause in Its entirety," which is the reason why man cannot see God's predestination.
Quote #11
[Dante to St. James]: I said: "Hope is the certain expectation
of future glory; it is the result
of God's grace and of merit we have earned. (Par. XXV, 67-69)
In the virtuous, then, hope tempers free will and helps to keep it intact. Hope comes from God's grace, which is unmerited love, and the "merit we have earned." Thus, hope is an expression of excessive love that colors the way man uses his free will.
Quote #12
[Beatrice]: "The will has a good blossoming in men;
but then the never-ending downpours turn
the sound plums into rotten, empty skins.
For innocence and trust are to be found
only in little children; then they flee
even before a full beard cloaks the cheeks.
One, for as long as he still lisps, will fast,
but when his tongue is free at last, he gorges,
devouring any food through any month;
and one, while he still lisps, will love and heed
his mother, but when he acquires speech
more fully, he will long to see her buried." (Par. XXVII, 124-135)
This passage hints at an interesting link between innocence and language. Only while man is a child (i.e. while he lisps) will he have "innocence and trust." Once he has grown (i.e. when he can speak properly), does he inherit his free will and lose his innocence. It seems, then, that free will and purity cannot exist simultaneously.
Quote #13
And know that there, below, the transverse row
that cuts across the two divisions, sit
souls who are there for merits not their own,
but – with certain conditions – others' merits:
for all of these are souls who left their bodies
before they had the power of true choice. (Par. XXXII, 40-45)
These "souls who are there [in Heaven] for merits not their own" are children. The message is that if one dies as a child, before he can properly use his free will, God does not hold that person's lack of will against her and automatically saves her. This expression of his mercy is conditional. Children who die unbaptized after Christ's coming are not saved, but are sent to Limbo, the first circle of Hell.