How we cite our quotes: (Chapter.Paragraph)
Quote #1
Historically, a Wall Street firm worried over the creditworthiness of its customers; its customers often took it on faith that the casino would be able to pay off its winners. (2.58)
This that Wall Street firms will always have the money to pay off their debts is a key component of the American financial system. They're the experts, right? But if this assumption is proven wrong, as it is by the end of The Big Short, where does that leave us? We'll have to look deeper to find out.
Quote #2
Mike Burry lacked faith. "I'm not making a bet against a bond," he said. "I'm making a bet against a system" (2.58)
If you ask Michael Burry what he thinks about the financial system, he won't make any bones about it—he thinks that most of it is BS. Although everything seems perfectly ordered on the surface, it's actually quite chaotic.
Quote #3
Even as it came to dwarf the stock market, the bond market eluded serious regulation. (3.2)
Though the financial industry has to deal with many regulations, the bond market somehow sneaks by unnoticed. Do you think it's a coincidence that things ended up going so rotten?
Quote #4
Why were sophisticated traders at AIG FP doing this stuff? If credit default swaps were insurance, why weren't they regulated as insurance? (3.41)
That's a good question, Michael Lewis, and we were actually hoping that you had an answer. No? Putting that aside, however, the uncomfortable truth is that there isn't a real answer—the rules got exploited simply because it was more profitable to exploit them. Gross, huh?
Quote #5
Moody's and S&P claimed they were impossible to game. But everyone on Wall Street knew that the people who ran the models were ripe for exploitation. (4.43)
Corruption can take many different forms. It can take the form of failing to rate stocks accurately. In can take the form of placing too much trust in banks. It can even take the form of former ratings analysts spilling their secrets to Wall Street for some sweet consultant cash. No matter how you look at it, these "regulations" don't count for much.
Quote #6
"In the course of trying to figure it out, we realized that there's a reason why it doesn't quite make sense to us. It's because it doesn't make sense." (5.48)
Charlie Ledley hits the nail on the head with this one. Our short-selling heroes keep trying to find order underpinning the subprime market, but there isn't any order—just chaos as far as the eye can see. In fact, the system was expressly created to achieve this chaos.
Quote #7
There weren't enough Americans with s***ty credit taking out loans to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product. Wall Street needed his bets in order to synthesize more of them. (6.17)
Our heroes end up playing right into Wall Street's hands because their bets against the market allow the banks to create what are essentially fake bonds. It's at this moment that Eisman fully realizes the extent of Wall Street's corruption: if there's a loophole that can be exploited for short-term profit, then that sucker is going to be exploited to high heaven.
Quote #8
"That's why the losses in the financial system are so much greater than just the subprime loans. [...] I was like, This is allowed?" (6.17)
In other words, Eisman is saying here that the creation of synthetic CDOs (which are fake mortgage bonds that contain no mortgages, but are instead bets against mortgages) is what caused the financial crisis. Want to know what's even worse? It was all legal.
Quote #9
"In Vegas it became clear to me that this huge industry was just trusting in the ratings," Eisman said. "Everyone believed in the ratings, so they didn't have to think about it." (6.46)
As much as we can blame Wall Street for taking advantage of consumers, the ratings agencies deserve an equal amount of blame. They could have stopped the subprime market at any time by taking a closer look at the mortgages in question and accurately rating them, but they were too blinded by potential profits to do the right thing.
Quote #10
This was insane: The arbiter of the value of the bonds lacked access to relevant information about the bonds. (7.20)
Here's how bad things are within the ratings agencies: they don't even know what's inside the mortgage bonds they're rating. That's like a mechanic working on your car without opening the hood, or a doctor treating an illness over email. It just doesn't make sense.