How we cite our quotes: (Book.Chapter.Bekker #s); all Bekker line numbers are approximate, since they are keyed to the original Greek.
Quote #1
For even if this is the same thing for an individual and a city, to secure and preserve the good of the city appears to be something greater and more complete: the good of the individual by himself is certainly desirable enough, but that of a nation and of cities is nobler and more divine. (I.2.1094b7-10)
Aristotle's speaking here of the greatest good, which he posits is the "political art." He chooses this because human life is carried out in community and the best chance we have for happiness as individuals is to live in a just society governed by good laws. Though he values individual happiness and will talk about how happy individuals contribute to the health of the city, he makes no bones about who's more important here. Individual happiness isn't necessarily a casualty in the search for the common good—but it's a lot less important.
Quote #2
But he who is excessive and vulgar exceeds in spending beyond what is needful, as has been said. For on small things, he lavishes much expense and makes an ostentatious display of himself contrary to what is proper...And he will do all such things not for the sake of the noble but to display his wealth. (4.2.1123a20-26)
Those with money have an obligation to use their goods to help advance society. When a person abuses his goods by expending them as he shouldn't, he also does a great social wrong. Aristotle says time and again that members of a community (which is really a political "friendship") must contribute what they can to the common good. In this light, the vulgar person isn't just tacky; he's downright harmful.
Quote #3
But instances of good fortune too seem to contribute to greatness of soul, since the wellborn deem themselves worthy of honor, as do those who possess political power or wealth. For they are in a position of superiority, and everything superior in point of goodness is more honorable. Hence these sorts of things render people more great souled, since they are honored by some as a result. (4.3.1124a21-25)
Aristotle's being pretty slippery in his assessment of privilege here. In this conversation about the "great souled person," he seems to be saying that wealth guarantees virtuous nobility. And he kind of is. However, Aristotle isn't implying that all people with money are noble. While it may be easier for them to achieve a high moral standing, their power and wealth don't guarantee goodness, let alone a perfection of virtue.
Quote #4
For it is a difficult and august thing to be superior among the fortunate, but easy to be that way among the middling sorts; and to exalt oneself among the former is not a lowborn thing, but to do so among the latter is crude, just as is using one's strength among the weak. (4.3.1124b20-23)
Aristotle's speaking here of the "great souled," powerful, wellborn people with a whole lot of virtue. This person is of somewhat mixed character, according to our modern sensibilities. He's basically a well-intentioned snob.
As such, his job isn't to please the unwashed masses. He needs to shine at the highest levels of society in order to benefit the community. Such a man shouldn't be getting cheap validation from those who are socially miles away from him.
Quote #5
[...] for all agree that what is just in distributions ought to accord with a certain merit. Nevertheless, all do not mean the same thing by merit; rather, democrats say it is freedom; oligarchs, wealth; others, good birth; aristocrats, virtue. (5.3.1131a25-29)
In speaking of distributive justice, Aristotle gives us a mini-analysis of how different types of regimes calculate merit. It's important for Aristotle's social math to determine a correct proportion for the distribution of common goods. Everyone surely should not get exactly the same amount, especially if they don't contribute to society. But how to decide who's worthy presents a problem. Each type of society values certain goods above others, making it difficult to determine an absolute value.
Quote #6
[...] without friends, no one would choose to live, even if he possessed all other goods; and indeed those who are wealthy or have acquired political offices and power seem to be in need of friends most of all. What benefit would there be in such prosperity of one were deprive of [the opportunity to perform] a good deed, which arise and is most praiseworthy in relation to friends especially? Or how could one's prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends? (8.1.1155a8-10)
Friends are imagined here as a kind of social and financial insurance: they give us the opportunity to do good deeds (and thereby gain honor) and they help to protect us from our archenemies, who are clearly interested in ruining us financially.
Aristotle isn't being callous here; he's speaking in practical terms of the benefits of finding allies within the community. Because while living together can offer many good things, the world can get very ugly to us when we're alone—and maybe even more so when fortune's on the line.
Quote #7
The deviation from kingship is tyranny, for while both are monarchical, they differ most because the tyrant looks to what is advantageous for himself and the king to what is advantageous for the ruled. (8.10.1160b1-3)
It's hard to argue with these definitions of kingship and tyranny, even if Aristotle's views on kingship are a little rose-colored. He defines the regimes—or types of rule—not in order to give us a civics lesson; he does it to show that what we know about political society is reflected in more intimate communities.
So what we know of the good king might be applied to the father of a household, and so on down the line. Whatever notions Aristotle has of justice as it applies to society as a whole, then, can easily be adapted to individual relationships.
Quote #8
It seems, then, that each partner correctly deems himself worthy of something—that is, that one ought to distribute more to each of them from the friendship, but not more of the same thing. Rather, to the person who is superior, one ought to distribute honor, and to the one in need, gain. Honor is the reward of virtue and of benefaction, whereas aid is the gain appropriate to need. (8.14.1163b1-3)
Aristotle equates the relationship between friends to the terms of justice normally reserved for conversations about "social contract." While this friendship is not equal—it's based on superiority—there are still things that each person can and should contribute. Aristotle uses the language of distributive justice to explain this concept. The superior friend "gains" nothing tangible, but he does earn honor, which is nobler. While this is a friendship of utility and therefore not the best, it is important: it represents the relationship between a king and his subjects.
Quote #9
But since different things go to parents, brothers, comrades, and benefactors, one must distribute to each what is properly his and fitting. People appear to do this in fact: they invite their relatives to weddings because the family line is something they share in common, as are the actions pertaining to their family. (9.2.1165a16-21)
Aristotle speaks often about distributive justice, which basically states that each person in any given community (including families) gets what's rightly theirs. That doesn't mean that each person receives (or gives) the same things, but that each person receives in proportion to what they contribute to the common good. The same principle applies to giving or giving back: you've got to render what is properly due to each person according to rank or relationship. This type of exchange is the grease that keeps the wheels of society—on the macro- and micro-levels—turning.
Quote #10
But in most cities, what concerns such things has been utterly neglected, and each lives as he wishes, 'laying down the sacred law for children and wife' in the manner of the Cyclops. The most excellent thing, then, is for the public care to be correct. But when cities utterly neglect the public care, it would seem appropriate for each individual to contribute to the virtue of his own offspring and friends, or at last to make the choice to do so. (10.9.1180a27-32)
Aristotle has a little rant at the end of Ethics concerning the creation of good citizens. He feels that it should be (or at least, has been) the concern of the political realm to enshrine and transmit principles of virtue to citizens through solid lawmaking. However, things are falling apart. In the absence of public intervention, the onus for the moral education of people falls to friends and family. Aristotle is all for that, but there is the sense that getting to what is good—either for the community or the individual—is at least partially the responsibility of the regime.