How we cite our quotes: (Book.Chapter.Bekker #s); all Bekker line numbers are approximate, since they are keyed to the original Greek.
Quote #1
But experience of particular things seems to be courage as well. So it is that Socrates too supposed courage to be knowledge. Yet different people are experienced in different things, and in matters of war, it is the professional soldiers who are such. For there seem to be many false alarms in war, which professional soldiers especially see through. (3.8.1116b4-7)
Aristotle has a lot of positive things to say about "knowers," or people who seem to have a head for knowing something, as an expert might. In this case, having professional knowledge (an intellectual virtue) can lead to displaying a moral virtue (courage, in this case). However, knowledge only gets you so far. For these "courageous" soldiers, things begin to fall apart when they enter into unknown territory, whenever something exceeds their experience.
Quote #2
But the magnificent person resembles a knower, since he is able to contemplate what is fitting and to spend great amounts in a suitable way. (4.2.1122a35-36)
We're getting at knowledge once again through a moral virtue. A magnificent person (one who expends large sums of money for the greater good) can't just throw his money around. He has to use his intellect (and tact) to understand where it'll best be used and how the work to be done with it will be made awesome. This requires both thought and sensitivity, something that comes from understanding the needs of the community.
Quote #3
Similarly too, people suppose that to know the just and unjust things is in no way to be wise, because it is not difficult to comprehend what the laws say (but these are not the just things, except incidentally). But how the just things are done and how they are distributed—this is indeed a greater task than to know what is conducive to health... (5.9.1137a10-4)
Though both wisdom and comprehension are both intellectual virtues, Aristotle's pretty clear here about which one is superior. Simply grasping intellectually what lawgivers say about justice isn't enough to maintain the balance of society. True wisdom in this case requires both perception and experience to understand how justice works best on a day-to-day (and case-to-case) basis. It's not hard to imagine that Aristotle's responding to those who maybe poke fun at the "political art."
Quote #4
It is clear, as a result, that the most precise of the sciences would be wisdom. The wise person, therefore, ought not only to know what proceeds from the principles but also to attain the truth about the principles. Wisdom, as a result, would be intellect and science, a science of the most honorable matters that has as it were, its capstone. (6.7.1141a16-21)
Aristotle's describing the action of the contemplative life: to be able to understand stuff, whether how it originates or what it actually is. Though this sounds a little underwhelming, think about it for a minute. If you understood how things worked and what that meant for life on earth (without Googling it), you'd be the guru of everything.
Quote #5
Hence even some who are without knowledge—those who have experience, among others—are more skilled in acting than are others who have knowledge. (6.7.1141b17-18)
Aristotle explains to us that while those with knowledge (i.e. the wise) should be revered as having the best of intellectual virtues, quite frankly, they're sometimes worthless. This is because they don't do anything.
That is the trap of the contemplative life: to be able to perceive the truth, but not to act on one's behalf. So the prudent have the advantage here. With experience, a person might make good decisions that make life better (i.e. happier). And since the prudent are concerned with good actions, the odds are that they'll rouse themselves from thought long enough to complete something.
Quote #6
For wisdom, on the one hand, will not contemplate anything as a result of which a human being will be happy (since wisdom is not concerned with anything that is coming-into-being), while prudence, on the other hand, does pertain to this. (6.12.1143b19-22)
The wise spend their time obtaining and contemplating universal, scientific knowledge (i.e. that which "does not admit to being otherwise). This is all very well and good, but it also means that the wise don't concern themselves with actions, or with the deliberation that has to precede choice. As a result, their lives to don't actively seek to bring the good home to them. While the wise seek to educate themselves, they don't do it for a different end; education is always for the sake of knowledge and nothing else.
Quote #7
For in both children and beasts, the natural characteristics are present, but they are manifestly harmful in the absence of intellect. Yet this much does seem to be seen—that just as a strong body moving without eyesight will end up stumbling with considerable force because it is without sight, so it is also in this case [of having the natural virtues in the absence of intellect]. (6.13.1144b9-13)
Virtues (or characteristics) are necessary for our happiness, but they can't fully blossom in us without intellect. But what is intellect in this case? It's the ability to comprehend or to grasp what is taught, surely.
Because without this ability, we can't grasp the expectations that our community has for our behavior. Aristotle also tells us that we can't truly make choices without the ability to deliberate and make choices. So while the virtues might, after a good education and proper habituation, ensure that our desires are correct, we can't even grasp what's at issue without intellect.
Quote #8
But stating the arguments that proceed from science is not a sign of anything, for even people in the grip of these passions state demonstrations and verses of Empedocles, and those who are first learning will put together arguments but not yet understand them. For one must grow naturally into the knowledge, and that requires time. (7.3.1147a18-22)
Aristotle tells us that knowledge in itself doesn't constitute wisdom…or even prudence. In both cases, we have to contemplate "science" long enough to "have" it, to be in actual, useful possession of it. Otherwise, we're really no better than parrots. Drunk parrots, at that.
Quote #9
For it is not when science in the authoritative sense seems to be present that the experience of the lack of self-restraint occurs, nor is it this science that is dragged around on account of passion, but rather that [knowledge] which is bound up with perception. (7.3.1147b16-18)
Aristotle divides the world into two types of people: the knowers and the non-knowers.
Non-knowers are those who lack knowledge, either through a lack of intellect or education, or from some temporary condition (i.e. drunkenness). It ought to be impossible for a knower to fall into error (i.e. lacking self-restraint).
But humans can know certain things (universal knowledge) and still lack the knowledge of "defining boundaries," or the limits of things. When that happens, we only have partial knowledge and may not be able to see consequences of our actions. So while we may know that indulgence in fifteen doughnuts every day isn't great for us, we may still be shocked at a diagnosis of diabetes.
Quote #10
[...] it would also be reasonable for the gods to delight in what is best and most akin to them—this would be the intellect—and to benefit in return those who cherish this above all and honor it, on the grounds that these latter are caring for what is dear to the gods...And that all these things are available to the wise person especially is not unclear. He is dearest to the gods, therefore, and it is likely that this same person is also happiest. As a result, in this way too, the wise person would be especially happy. (10.8.1179a26-32)
And there you have it: to be wise is to be happy.
More than that, it's to be blessed by the gods. Dang. It's interesting that Aristotle, who's been so interested in establishing what is particular to humans, should discover that the best thing for them is not to be humans but to be gods. Oh, the irony.
But seriously, humanity is, in this philosophy, marked by a kind of divinity not available to animals. That divinity is the intellect, which can perceive itself and grasp the idea of superior ideals and beings.