How we cite our quotes: (Volume.Part.Chapter.Paragraph). We used Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky's translation.
Quote #1
[Anna Mikhailovna] woke up in the morning and told the Rostovs and all her acquaintances the details of Count Bezukhov's death. She said that the count had died as she would like to die, that his end had been not only touching, but also instructive; and the last meeting of the father and son had been so touching that she could not recall it without tears, and that she did not know who had behaved better in those terrible moments: the father, who remembered everything and everyone so well in the last minutes and said such touching things to the son; or Pierre, who was a pity to see, he was so crushed, but who nevertheless tried to hide his sorrow, so as not to upset his dying father. [...] She also told disapprovingly about the actions of the princess and Prince Vassily, but as a great secret and in a whisper. (1.1.21.43)
Like the best PR person, Anna Mikhailovna gets out in front of the story in order to control it. This way no one would ever argue that Pierre was trying to do some underhanded thing with the will.
Quote #2
Prince Andrei listened carefully to Prince Bagration's exchanges with the commanders and to the orders he gave, and noticed, to his surprise, that no orders were given, and that Prince Bagration only tried to pretend that all that was done by necessity, chance, or the will of a particular commander [...]. Prince Andrei noticed that, in spite of the chance character of events and their independence of the commander's will, his presence accomplished a very great deal. Commanders who rode up to Prince Bagration with troubled faces became calm, soldiers and officers greeted him merrily and became more animated in his presence, and obviously showed off their courage before him. (1.2.17.25)
This is the beginning of the book's argument that in actual war there is no such thing as strategy or plan. There is only morale, and so the best commanders, like this guy, are the ones who are able to boost the spirits of everyone around them.
Quote #3
[T]he one young, gentle voice of the emperor Alexander was distinctly heard. He uttered a greeting, and the first regiment bawled out such a deafening, prolonged, and joyful "Hurrah!" that the men themselves were awestruck at the multitude and strength of the huge bulk they made up. Rostov, standing in the front ranks of Kutuzov's army, which the sovereign rode up to first, had the same feeling that was experienced by every man in that army—a feeling of self forgetfulness, a proud awareness of strength, and a passionate attraction to him who was the cause of this solemnity. He felt that it would take only one word from this man for that whole mass (and he himself bound up with it—an insignificant speck) to go through fire and water, to crime, to death, or to the greatest heroism, and therefore he could not but tremble and thrill at the sight of that at approaching word. (1.3.8.7)
Do you think modern soldiers have this level of awe and worshipfulness for their commander in chief? Is that a good or bad thing?
Quote #4
On the way home, Prince Andrei could not help asking Kutuzov, who was sitting silently next to him, what he thought about the next day's battle. Kutuzov looked sternly at his adjutant, paused, and said: "I think the battle will be lost, and I said so to Count Tolstoy and asked him to convey it to the sovereign. And what do you think he replied? Eh, mon cher général, je me mêle de riz et des côtelettes, mêlez-vous des affaires de la guerre. [Ah, my dear general, I'm involved in rice and cutlets, involve yourself in matters of war.] Yes . . . That was the answer I got!" (1.3.11.31-32)
This is the first sense we get that Kutuzov will be a lot more willing than anyone else to speak truth to power. Later, he'll be the only one arguing with Alexander about war strategy.
Quote #5
After reaching home Nicholas was at first serious and even dull. He was worried by the impending necessity of interfering in the stupid business matters for which his mother had called him home. To throw off this burden as quickly as possible, on the third day after his arrival he went, angry and scowling and without answering questions as to where he was going, to Mitenka's lodge and demanded an account of everything. But what an account of everything might be Nicholas knew even less than the frightened and bewildered Mitenka. The conversation and the examination of the accounts with Mitenka did not last long. [...] [T]he young count, red in the face and with bloodshot eyes, dragged Mitenka out by the scruff of the neck and applied his foot and knee to his behind with great agility at convenient moments between the words, shouting, "Be off! Never let me see your face here again, you villain!" [...] Next day the old count called his son aside and, with an embarrassed smile, said to him:
"But you know, my dear boy, it's a pity you got excited! Mitenka has told me all about it. [...] You were angry that he had not entered those 700 rubles. But they were carried forward and you did not look at the other page." (2.4.2.1-10)
There's an interesting power play here between the aristocratic masters and their serfs. On the one hand, Nikolai owns the serf and can beat him (or even kill him) without any legal issues. On the other hand, the serf is the only one who knows how to do the books for the estate, so the masters have to rely on him for all their financial matters. Who has the upper hand?
Quote #6
After all that Napoleon had said to him those bursts of anger and the last dryly spoken words: "I will detain you no longer, General; you shall receive my letter," Balashev felt convinced that Napoleon would not wish to see him, and would even avoid another meeting with him – an insulted envoy – especially as he had witnessed his unseemly anger. But, to his surprise, Balashev received, through Duroc, an invitation to dine with the Emperor that day. [...] Napoleon met Balashev cheerfully and amiably. He not only showed no sign of constraint or self reproach on account of his outburst that morning, but, on the contrary, tried to reassure Balashev. It was evident that he had long been convinced that it was impossible for him to make a mistake, and that in his perception whatever he did was right, not because it harmonized with any idea of right and wrong, but because he did it. (3.1.7.1-3)
Hmm...guess the old saying is right – all power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely. Constantly surrounded by kowtowing yes-men, Napoleon has basically lost all self-awareness.
Quote #7
While this was taking place in Petersburg the French had already passed Smolensk and were drawing nearer and nearer to Moscow. Napoleon's historian Thiers, like other of his historians, trying to justify his hero says that he was drawn to the walls of Moscow against his will. He is as right as other historians who look for the explanation of historic events in the will of one man; he is as right as the Russian historians who maintain that Napoleon was drawn to Moscow by the skill of the Russian commanders. Here besides the law of retrospection, which regards all the past as a preparation for events that subsequently occur, the law of reciprocity comes in, confusing the whole matter. A good chess player having lost a game is sincerely convinced that his loss resulted from a mistake he made and looks for that mistake in the opening, but forgets that at each stage of the game there were similar mistakes and that none of his moves were perfect. He only notices the mistake to which he pays attention, because his opponent took advantage of it. How much more complex than this is the game of war, which occurs under certain limits of time, and where it is not one will that manipulates lifeless objects, but everything results from innumerable conflicts of various wills! (3.2.7.1)
Yeah, historians, get with the program already. Everything that happens, happens because of all the other things that happened beforehand. So attributing all the power to affect history to one person, or even a small group of people, is just crazy.
Quote #8
Napoleon at the battle of Borodino fulfilled his office as representative of power as well as, and even better than, at other battles. He did nothing harmful to the progress of the battle; he inclined to the most reasonable opinions, he made no confusion, did not contradict himself, did not get frightened or run away from the field of battle, but with his great tact and military experience carried out his role of appearing to command, calmly and with dignity. (3.2.28.11)
Here's Tolstoy's take on power. The guy who looks like he's at the top is just a convenient figurehead or symbol for the actual power, which is in the vast multitude of people who seem to be following him.
Quote #9
On the rug-covered bench where Pierre had seen him in the morning sat Kutuzov, his gray head hanging, his heavy body relaxed. He gave no orders, but only assented to or dissented from what others suggested. [...] He listened to the reports that were brought him and gave directions when his subordinates demanded that of him; but when listening to the reports it seemed as if he were not interested in the import of the words spoken, but rather in something else – in the expression of face and tone of voice of those who were reporting. By long years of military experience he knew, and with the wisdom of age understood, that it is impossible for one man to direct hundreds of thousands of others struggling with death, and he knew that the result of a battle is decided not by the orders of a commander in chief, nor the place where the troops are stationed, nor by the number of cannon or of slaughtered men, but by that intangible force called the spirit of the army, and he watched this force and guided it in as far as that was in his power. (3.2.35.1-2)
For Tolstoy, Kutuzov is the only person who really understands what his role is in all of this – just to sit there, look calm, and try as best as possible to go with the flow. It helps, of course, that's he's got his finger on the pulse of the army and knows what it can and can't do at any given moment. Does this come with experience, or is this some inborn trait?
Quote #10
Man's mind cannot grasp the causes of events in their completeness, but the desire to find those causes is implanted in man's soul. And without considering the multiplicity and complexity of the conditions any one of which taken separately may seem to be the cause, he snatches at the first approximation to a cause that seems to him intelligible and says: "This is the cause!" In historical events (where the actions of men are the subject of observation) the first and most primitive approximation to present itself was the will of the gods and, after that, the will of those who stood in the most prominent position – the heroes of history. But we need only penetrate to the essence of any historic event – which lies in the activity of the general mass of men who take part in it – to be convinced that the will of the historic hero does not control the actions of the mass but is itself continually controlled. It may seem to be a matter of indifference whether we understand the meaning of historical events this way or that; yet there is the same difference between a man who says that the people of the West moved on the East because Napoleon wished it and a man who says that this happened because it had to happen, as there is between those who declared that the earth was stationary and that the planets moved round it and those who admitted that they did not know what upheld the earth, but knew there were laws directing its movement and that of the other planets. There is, and can be, no cause of an historical event except the one cause of all causes. But there are laws directing events, and some of these laws are known to us while we are conscious of others we cannot comprehend. The discovery of these laws is only possible when we have quite abandoned the attempt to find the cause in the will of some one man, just as the discovery of the laws of the motion of the planets was possible only when men abandoned the conception of the fixity of the earth. (4.2.1.1)
Tolstoy really wants to make the study of history more like a hard science. Notice how he's comparing his discoveries with those of Galileo. He argues that there must be some kind of rules to the way historical events happen, which we could see if only we could study the thing long enough. It's true that he references God as the ultimate cause ("there can be no cause except the one cause of all causes"), but it's clear that he's not talking about an intrusive God who micromanages human affairs, but instead a watchmaker God, who sets the mechanism in motion and then lets it go.